CoinSleuth

What Sui Move’s Safety Checks Do Not Cover

For anyone relying on a Sui protocol to safeguard assets, a key question is whether its security checks cover the behavior that matters—not just whether its code passes the language’s built-in checks.

A November 13, 2026 discussion of Certora Sui Prover examines what the Sui Move type system and verifier can guarantee, then identifies five gaps they do not cover: bits lost during shifts, signed values stored in unsigned integers, privileged functions without caller checks, object ownership relationships that go unchecked, and older package versions that remain callable.

The author discusses vulnerabilities involving Cetus, Aftermath Finance, Typus Finance and Scallop, and describes expressing the gaps as verifiable Certora rules labeled P1–P4, followed by protocol invariants labeled P5–P8. The discussion also recommends testing with test_scenario and Sui Prover.

The practical lesson is about the boundary of a proof: formal verification depends on stating the properties to check and the assumptions behind them. Passing built-in checks alone does not establish that those additional protocol properties hold.

Further reading