For anyone relying on a signer to protect a private key, BIP 461 addresses a trust question: can two independent signers be checked against each other for signs that key material is leaking through their signatures?
The specification, described in the original report published November 18, 2026, proposes an ECDSA signing algorithm whose output is determined entirely by the private key and message. It derives the nonce using RFC 6979, applies low-r grinding and normalizes to low-s. This removes the signer’s freedom to choose the nonce or s value, making cross-checking possible.
The proposed algorithm limits a DER-encoded signature to 70 bytes, or 71 bytes with the sighash byte. The specification also sets out nonce derivation, signing, verification and DeterministicSign, and discusses backward compatibility with existing consensus rules and a reference implementation. These are features of the proposed specification, not a claim that the algorithm has been adopted as a consensus rule.

